Companies invest significantly in expanding and maintaining their customer base. In doing so, they increase their market share and thereby their market position compared to competitors. They therefore have a legitimate interest in not losing their customer base due to unfair competition or anti-competitive hindrance. Companies are particularly hard hit by the poaching of customers by other market participants, especially competitors. The poaching of end customers takes place, for example, through targeted contact and interception of customers, be they consumers or companies, or through support in terminating contracts. It is also conceivable that a competitor wants to increase its market share by combining different products and services. This indirectly deprives potential end customers of the opportunity not to turn to a competitor in the first place.<\/p>\n
The Act to Prevent Unfair Competition, or UWG for short, and the Act Against Restraints of Competition, or GWB for short, contain regulations on how the poaching of customers or, in general, the customer-related hindrance of competitors are to be assessed. Such obstruction may be unfair, i.e. anti-competitive and impermissible. It can also violate antitrust law. In both cases, the company concerned can issue a warning for unfair business conduct or for abuse of a dominant or strong market position and demand injunctive relief and compensation.<\/p>\n
However, not every poaching of current or potential customer relationships is anti-competitive. Here you will find out which special circumstances and requirements must be met for an unfair act or an anti-competitive hindrance to occur. In principle, both the UWG and the GWB protect competition for the market and market shares. And part of competition is attracting new customers. Poaching customers is therefore part of competitive action and is therefore generally permissible. This means that not every hindrance to a competitor is prohibited. Your own competitive action necessarily automatically hinders a competitor. Consequently, a competitor's customer base is not in itself a protected asset. Competition thrives on customers switching providers and other market participants entering the market. In principle, even a dominant company is entitled to take consumers away from a competitor.<\/p>\n
Das Gesetz in Form des UWG (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb) zieht erst dort eine Grenze, wo eine gesch\u00e4ftliche Handlung gezielt gegen einen Mitbewerber eingesetzt wird. Unter unlauterer Behinderung wird folglich nur eine Beeintr\u00e4chtigung der wettbewerblichen Entfaltungsm\u00f6glichkeit gesehen. Zugleich fordert das UWG, dass diese Beeintr\u00e4chtigung gezielt erfolgt. Erst durch das Merkmal „gezielt“ wird aus einer an sich zul\u00e4ssigen Einschr\u00e4nkung ein Versto\u00df gegen Wettbewerbsrecht. Gezielte Behinderung bedeutet nach der Rechtsprechung, insbesondere des OLG D\u00fcsseldorf sowie des OLG Frankfurt, dass unter Ber\u00fccksichtigung aller Umst\u00e4nde eine gesch\u00e4ftliche Handlung vor allem nicht auf die F\u00f6rderung der eigenen wettbewerblichen Entfaltung auf dem nachgelagerten Markt dient, sondern auf die Behinderung eines Mitbewerbers gerichtet ist. Die gezielte Mitbewerberbehinderung ergibt sich folglich aus der Verdr\u00e4ngungsabsicht. <\/p>\n
Case law has formed case groups for unfair obstruction aimed at end customers or competitors. Only if one of these groups of cases applies will courts assume that there is an unfair commercial act because of buyers on the downstream market level, the sales market. Case law is always based on the principle that the targeted and systematic penetration of a competitor's customer base and the exclusion of end customers is part of and reason for competition. A violation of the UWG only occurs if additional circumstances and actions by the competitor arise. The affected competitor can then demand injunctive relief and compensation.<\/p>\n
One of these case groups is the interception of potential end customers. Above all, influencing end users, especially consumers, with unfair means leads to unfair targeted obstruction and a violation of competition law. What is meant here is the exertion of pressure, very short reflection times, deception about circumstances, for example about the competitor and their products, the redirection of customer orders, especially typo domains or call redirections, or the influence on search engines.<\/p>\n
Another case group is the poaching of existing end customers. Here, too, the competitor must act unfairly before one can assume a violation of competition law according to the UWG. This requires special circumstances and unfair means so that poaching, which is generally permissible, goes beyond permissible competition. Attracting customers with discounts or benefits to encourage them to switch is an expression of competition and permissible. However, the line between competition and targeted hindrance of competitors is crossed when the end customer cannot make an informed decision or is put under pressure. Inducing a breach of contract, such as immediate termination of the contract even though there is no good reason, will generally constitute a case of unfair competition, especially if the customer's decision is unfairly influenced. The request for termination by the company is only inadmissible if there is no right of termination or if the consumer or customer's decision is improperly influenced.<\/p>\n
Finally, the coupling of services can give rise to accusations of unfair competition and claims for damages and injunctive relief. If a company designs its services in such a way that a customer can now purchase a specific product if he or she purchases another product or service, it may be violating the law, in particular the UWG, under certain conditions. This can represent unfair competition, particularly in the case of the IT industry and the coupling of software products. However, such a coupling is not per se a violation of the UWG. In principle, every company is free to offer its products and services as it wishes. As a rule, tying circumstances are judged according to antitrust law unless coercion, misleading or exerting pressure accompany the tying. The requirements of antitrust law are much stricter and may not be undermined by the UWG.<\/p>\n
So that a consumer or customer-related unfair hindrance also represents an unfair hindrance and violates antitrust law, in particular the provisions of the GWB, in particular Section 19 Paragraph 2 No. 1 GWB in conjunction with Section 18 Paragraph 4 GWB or Section 20 Paragraph 1 GWB, violates it, an abuse of market power must be proven. However, this is not always the case when poaching customers. <\/p>\n
Das Verbot einer unbilligen missbr\u00e4uchlichen Behinderung setzt voraus, dass das Unternehmen, dem die Behinderung vorgeworfen wird, marktbeherrschend oder zumindest marktstark ist. Marktbeherrschung wird im Rahmen des GWB angenommen, wenn ein Unternehmen auf dem relevanten sachlichen und \u00f6rtlichen Markt einen Anteil von mehr als 40 % hat. Zun\u00e4chst ist also immer der relevante Markt zu bestimmen. Oft bereitet es jedoch Schwierigkeiten nachzuweisen, dass ein marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen einen Marktanteil von 40% und mehr hat. Aber nicht nur ein marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen darf seine Marktmacht nicht missbr\u00e4uchlich ausnutzen.<\/p>\n
Auch Unternehmen mit \u00fcberlegener Marktmacht ist es nicht erlaubt, von ihnen abh\u00e4ngige Mitbewerber zu behindern. Bei einer solchen Abh\u00e4ngigkeit kommt es also nicht auf die Marktbeherrschung an. Man spricht dann von Marktst\u00e4rke. Abh\u00e4ngigkeit liegt vor, wenn ein Unternehmen darauf angewiesen ist, dass ein anderes Unternehmen es beliefert, damit es seine Wettbewerbsf\u00e4higkeit erhalten kann. Dies ist immer dann der Fall, wenn das abh\u00e4ngige Unternehmen objektiv keine Belieferungsalternativen hat oder ihm solche nicht zumutbar sind. Ein Fachh\u00e4ndler ist etwa darauf angewiesen, ein bestimmtes Kernsortiment an Marken und Produkten anbieten zu k\u00f6nnen, um Erwartungen von Verbrauchern zu erf\u00fcllen. Man spricht dann von der sortimentsbedingten Abh\u00e4ngigkeit<\/a>. Entscheidend ist zwar immer die Einzelfall. Indizien f\u00fcr Abh\u00e4ngigkeit und damit von relativer Marktmacht sind die hohe Bekanntheit eine Marke, hohe Werbebudgets des marktstarken Unternehmens und dessen Distributionsrate. Distributionsrate meint den Anteil der Fachh\u00e4ndler, die ein bestimmtes Produkt f\u00fchren. Je h\u00f6her die Distributionsrate und die Abdeckung des relevanten Marktes mit dem Produkt ist, desto eher kommt eine \u00fcberlegene Marktmacht in Betracht (lesen Sie hier n\u00e4here Erl\u00e4uterungen zur Distributionsrate und ein Urteil des OLG D\u00fcsseldorf).<\/p>\n