In principle, the liability of the shareholders of a GmbH is for the liabilities of the company Company excluded according to the GmbHG and judgments of the BGH (Federal Court of Justice). Against this background, it often makes sense to restructure a group of companies to avoid access by creditors to retained profits of the parent company. However, there are cases in which, according to the BGH's case law on the GmbHG Liability of the shareholder or the parent company. In such a case, the profits that were transferred to the mother would no longer be protected. The following compilation of the most important legal aspects differentiates between the liability of shareholders for the company's liabilities and the options for retaining the profits of a subsidiary GmbH in an "access-safe manner" against access from creditors. Managing Director are obliged according to the GmbHG to avoid corresponding liability.
Principle: No access to shareholder assets
In principle, creditors have no opportunity to access the assets of the shareholders or the parent company to satisfy their claims. This applies regardless of whether the shareholder or shareholders are natural persons or companies themselves, such as GmbH. However, there are exceptions to this ban on direct liability on the shareholders' assets.
Profit transfer agreement
Ein Ergebnisabführungsvertrag zwischen dem Mutter- und Tochterunternehmen löst eine Mithaftung der Mutter-GmbH für die Tochtergesellschaft aus. Ein Ergebnisabführungsvertrag ist ein Unternehmensvertrag, in dem sich die Tochtergesellschaft als Organgesellschaft verpflichtet, ihren ganzen Gewinn an ein anderes Unternehmen, etwa die Muttergesellschaft (Organträger) abzuführen. Oftmals ist auch geregelt, dass die Tochtergesellschaft als Organgesellschaft ihre Leitung einem anderen Unternehmen, dem Organträger, unterstellt (Beherrschungsvertrag). Ergebnisabführungsverträge erlauben zwar eine steuerbegünstigte Abführung von Gewinnen der Organgesellschaft auf den Organträger. Allerdings ist mit dieser Gewinnabführung nach gesetzlichen Vorschriften zwingend eine Pflicht des Mutterunternehmens zur Übernahme von Verlusten verbunden, § 302 AktG analog. Diese aktienrechtlichen Vorschriften gelten bei anderen juristischen Personen wie der GmbH nach der Rechtsprechung in BGH-Urteilen entsprechend.
Such losses may in particular be liabilities of the subsidiary from liability cases. Creditors of the company can access this claim under Section 302 AktG analogously through seizure and transfer (Sections 829, 835 ZPO) and satisfy their claims. In addition, the law (section 301 AktG analogously) regulates the maximum amount of profit transfer. The legally mandatory obligation to assume losses through a profit transfer agreement, which would also have to be published in the commercial register and thus make internal information public to creditors, would contradict the goal of leaving liabilities from liability cases with the subsidiary. Regardless of the new structure of the corporate group, no profit transfer agreement should be concluded if the risk of pass-through liability is to be avoided.
Claims of creditors against the parent company
A further exception exists if the parent company has assumed contractual joint liability for liabilities or contractual obligations of the subsidiary towards its creditors, in particular contractual partners. The contractual basis for such joint liability can in particular be a surety, a guarantee, a letter of comfort or a co-signing of the respective contract with the creditor. If pass-through liability is to be avoided, the parent GmbH should not assume any joint liability for the liabilities or obligations of the subsidiary GmbH.
In another constellation, it is conceivable that creditors who have obtained a title against the subsidiary GmbH use this title to access the subsidiary GmbH's claims against the parent GmbH by means of compulsory enforcement. What is particularly important here is loan claims from subsidiaries against the parent company. Loans from the subsidiary to its GmbH shareholders should therefore also be avoided. The managing directors of both companies should always take this risk of indirect liability into account when entering into contracts between affiliated companies. By the way, this applies without restriction to Einmann-GmbH. GmbH law makes no exception for this.
Legal (joint) liability of the partner due to immorality
According to rulings by the Federal Court of Justice, (co-)liability of the GmbH shareholder, regardless of his share in the business, directly towards creditors of the affiliated company can only come into question if the shareholder intentionally and immorally causes damage to the creditors or intentionally and immorally allocates the company's assets to the subsidiary burdens of creditors. This requires a particularly blatant violation of the limits of permitted risk transfer to the subsidiary to the detriment of the creditors.
Material undercapitalization
As a rule, direct liability of the shareholders will have to be examined, especially in the event of an immoral material undercapitalization of the subsidiary and its continuation at the expense of the creditors. “Material undercapitalization” means an insufficient equity capitalization of the company that is clearly recognizable to insiders, which means that a failure to the detriment of the creditors can be expected in the normal course of business with a high probability that significantly exceeds the usual business risk (BGH, judgment of April 28, 2008 - Ref : II ZR 264/06, NJW 2008, 2437 – GAMMA decision).
It is important that direct liability of the GmbH shareholders towards creditors, even in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, is not possible according to the BGH in the event of mere thin capitalization, as there is no obligation for the shareholder of a GmbH to provide financial resources; This is often overlooked by managers. For a pass-through liability, it is always necessary for the creditors to suffer immoral damage caused by the actions of the shareholders or the managing directors of the parent company, for example if the managing directors of the parent company “speculate at the expense of the creditors” in the case of an insufficiently capitalized GmbH. The typical constellation that should therefore be avoided can arise in particular if the managing directors arrange for a business transaction between a subsidiary that is already insolvent or is close to insolvency with new creditors who are contractually obliged to make an advance payment.
Die Geschäftsführer der Muttergesellschaft müssen also erkennen, dass die Fortsetzung der Geschäfte in der Tochtergesellschaft trotz evidenter Unterschreitung der im konkreten Einzelfall betriebswirtschaftlich gebotenen Kapitalausstattung typischerweise gerade das Gesellschaftsvermögen weiter reduziert. Eine Durchgriffshaftung gegenüber Gläubigern durch deren Pfändung des Schadensersatzanspruchs des Tochterunternehmens gegen das Mutterunternehmen kommt also in Betracht, wenn die Geschäftsführer der Muttergesellschaft unter Verstoß gegen ordnungsgemäßes unternehmerisches Verhaltens die Fortsetzung der Geschäftstätigkeit der Tochter-GmbH anordnen, obwohl für jeden evident ist, dass das konkret vorhandene GmbH-Vermögen im Interesse der Gläubiger nur erhalten werden kann, indem alternativ Eigenkapital zugeführt, der Betrieb eingestellt oder beschränkt oder der Unternehmensgegenstand geändert wird. Diese Konstellation war zwar noch nicht Gegenstand der ober- oder höchstgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung, sollte jedoch gleichwohl vermieden werden, weil sie dann greifen könnte, wenn zwar keine Gläubigerschädigung vorliegt, aber eine Schädigung der Tochtergesellschaft.
Existentially devastating intervention
It is also possible, under strict conditions, for the subsidiary to have a claim against the parent company for damages due to “intervention that destroys its existence”, which the subsidiary’s creditors could seize in an emergency. Liability for the destruction of existence according to the corresponding judgments of the BGH, in particular in the Trihotel decision, requires the shareholders to intervene in the company's assets without compensation, leading to insolvency or intensifying this (BGH, judgment of July 16, 2007 - Ref: II ZR 3/04, NJW 2007, 2689 – Trihotel). This creates a claim for damages from the subsidiary GmbH due to intentional damage. This claim is only available to the subsidiary itself and can therefore only be asserted by it or the insolvency administrator. However, creditors of the subsidiary can seize this claim by means of compulsory enforcement if they already have a registered claim against the subsidiary GmbH and the seizure is not excluded due to the opening of insolvency proceedings of the subsidiary GmbH.
The prerequisite for an intervention that destroys the company's existence is that the shareholder has dominant influence, i.e. can largely freely decide on the fate of the subsidiary GmbH, and eliminates the GmbH's ability to fulfill its obligations, in particular through open or covert withdrawals, without any responsibility for these withdrawals there would be a legal basis. In addition, at least conditional intent is required both for the harm to society and for the harm to be immoral. A controlling shareholder must therefore at least accept that the company will suffer a loss of assets as a result of his withdrawal of assets, for which there will be no compensation, and that his behavior will cause or deepen the company's insolvency.
A material undercapitalization of a subsidiary GmbH, i.e. the failure to provide sufficient capital, does not mean such an intervention that destroys its existence. Because insufficient capital resources do not constitute, conceptually or in terms of value, an intervention in the company assets of the subsidiary GmbH, i.e. a “self-service” by the shareholder in front of the creditors. According to the new case law of the Federal Court of Justice, liability due to material undercapitalization is no longer a case of liability of the shareholders towards the subsidiary, but at most a case of direct liability towards creditors due to immoral damage, whereby the immorality must then also be proven.
Mixing of the assets of the group companies
Der Fall der Vermischung der Vermögensmassen von Mutter- und Tochtergesellschaft, bei der keine abgrenzbaren Haftungsmassen mehr bestehen („Waschkorb-Buchhaltung“) und Rechnungen nicht durch das jeweils betroffene Unternehmen ausgeglichen werden, kann ebenfalls eine Durchgriffshaftung auslösen. Ein Geschäftsführer und ein geschäftsführender Gesellschafter müssen daher immer darauf achten, dass die Vermögenssphären der jeweiligen Gesellschaften der Unternehmensgruppe klar voneinander getrennt bleiben.
Loan agreements under which the subsidiary grants loans to the company with controlling influence, for example the entire profit, are also risky because this would not mean that the entire profit ultimately remains with the parent company and creditors could seize the subsidiary GmbH's claim for repayment against the parent company. If there are no loan liabilities of the parent GmbH to the subsidiary GmbH, if company assets are not otherwise withdrawn from a subsidiary without compensation and if the subsidiary is equipped with sufficient capital, there is almost no scope for pass-through liability.
From the perspective of the GmbHG, the conclusion of a goods supply contract between companies affiliated with the de facto group should therefore be avoided if the parent company would be included in the supply chain as a seller and would be liable to the subsidiary GmbH in the event of defects or other liability cases arising from its position as a seller. Creditors could also seize this claim.
No liability only if there is actual control
Nach den entsprechenden Urteilen des BGH entsteht keine Durchgriffshaftung gegen einen GmbH-Gesellschafter, der faktisch, also ohne entsprechenden Beherrschungs- oder Ergebnisabführungsvertrag, die Geschicke in der Tochtergesellschaft bestimmt, etwa aufgrund der Identität der Geschäftsführung. Eine Haftung alleine wegen dieser faktischen Beherrschung hat der BGH unter ausdrücklicher Aufgabe seiner ursprünglichen Rechtsauffassung in seinen bisherigen Urteilen verneint.
Summary
The conclusion of a profit transfer agreement should not be concluded in the case of targeted retention of profits, as this would create an obligation for the parent company to compensate for losses to the subsidiary, analogous to Section 302 AktG. Creditors of the subsidiary can access the assets of the parent company through this compensation obligation, which would contradict the protection of profits.
Um eine möglichst gute Absicherung der Gewinne der Unternehmensgruppe gegen den Zugriff der Gläubiger zu erreichen, sollten stets die folgenden Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein:
It is advisable to conclude one or more contracts between the parent company and the subsidiary, according to which the subsidiary receives services from the parent company and reimburses them. This can in particular be a trademark license agreement or a rental agreement for business premises, vehicles or tools, which should be attached in writing for verification purposes. This can also avoid the impression of a withdrawal of the company's assets without compensation, which could be the basis for direct liability of the parent company. However, it must be taken into account that tax law may have special requirements for the tax recognition of the corresponding payment from such an exchange contract, for example the contract must withstand a third-party comparison. A hidden distribution of profits must also be avoided.
Die materielle Unterkapitalisierung der Tochtergesellschaft sollte unbedingt vermieden werden. Unter engen Voraussetzungen kann auch bei einer Vermischung der Vermögenssphären von Mutter- und Tochtergesellschaft oder der sittenwidrigen materiellen Unterkapitalisierung eines Unternehmens eine Haftung der Muttergesellschaft direkt gegenüber den Gläubigern der Tochtergesellschaft oder indirekt über die Gläubigerpfändung eines entsprechenden Schadensersatzanspruchs der Tochtergesellschaft gegen die Muttergesellschaft bei existenzvernichtendem Eingriff in Betracht kommen. Die Hürden an einen Durchgriff der GmbH-Gesellschafter auf das Vermögen der Muttergesellschaft sind zwar sehr hoch; insbesondere die „materielle Unterkapitalisierung“ setzt Sittenwidrigkeit voraus. Dieses Risiko lässt sich in der Praxis gut vermeiden. Insoweit ist auch zu berücksichtigen, dass der BGH in seinen jüngeren Urteilen ausdrücklich betont, dass die bloße Unterkapitalisierung alleine keine Haftung des GmbH-Gesellschafters begründet, da es keine „Finanzausstattungspflicht“ der Gesellschafterversammlung einer GmbH gibt. Eine Tochtergesellschaft sollte daher stets nach den Kapitalerhaltungsgrundsätzen mit Kapital ausgestattet sein, insbesondere darf keine Rückgewähr von für die Deckung des Stammkapitals erforderlichen Vermögens an die GmbH-Gesellschafter erfolgen.
Accompanying liability protection through contractual liability limitation clauses should also be agreed with the subsidiary's contractual partners. Ideally, the subsidiary will be able to individually negotiate and agree on liability limitations with contractual partners outside of the sales or rental terms and conditions. The prohibition of general terms and conditions law to exclude or limit the amount of liability for fault, even in cases of gross negligence, does not apply to specifically negotiated and agreed liability limitation clauses. If liability is limited or excluded, the risks of creditors accessing the group's assets are also reduced accordingly. Existing liability insurance also protects the assets of a group of companies.
According to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice, the Managing director of a personal liability with their private assets, if the GmbH suffers damage due to an intervention that destroys its existence or the parent GmbH suffers damage due to the establishment of liability for the destruction of its existence.
